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IPO Underpricing in Canadian Energy Sector 
 




This paper investigates empirical existence of theories of IPO underpricing in Canadian 
Energy Sector. The study based on IPO listed in all Canadian stock exchanges from 
1990-2014 analyzes level of IPO underpricing and its determinants. OLS regression is 
used to distinguish the relationship between various independent variables with 
dependent variable-level of underpricing. The result reveals that offer size, offer price has 
negative and significant effect on IPO underpricing, where as offer timing has very little 
explanatory power. Free float has a positive and significant effect on Canadian energy 
sector IPO under pricing. The significant effect of these variables identifies the presence 
of size based theory, winners curse theory in IPO pricing of Canadian energy sector. 
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                                                 CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background: 
Initial Public Offering (IPO) also known as stock market launch, is a process in which 
firms sell their stocks to the public for first time to raise capital through securities 
exchange. This process is known to cause three different anomalies to occur in the market 
Rajan and Servaes (1996) identify these as: Underpricing, Hot issue markets and Long 
run underperformance. Since decades IPO under pricing is one of the major concerns of 
investors and analysts, several researches and empirical studies have been conducted on 
the issue. Though IPO underpricing is common issue to both developed and developing 
markets, the factors responsible for it tend to vary based on market size, regulations, 
business sector, trading volume and uses of funds. IPO underpricing leads to generate 
interest in investor and flipping gives an opportunity to investor who bought the share at 
offer price but at the same time causes potential loss to issuer. 
 Most renowned one is information asymmetric theory based model –adverse selection 
model(Rock-1986) supported and extended by Beatty and Ritter-1986, Carter and 
Manaster (1990) that informed investors are more successful in selecting good IPOs 
(adverse selection model) and the exante uncertainty produces more underpricing to have 
greater return deliberately derived for informed investor. Baron (1982) on his moral 
hazard model and Booth smiths(1986) certification model supported by Titman and 
Trueman (1986) , Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Kumar And Tsetsekosc(1993) 
reputational capital paradigm and Allen and Faulhabers signaling model (1989) close to 
model of Griblatt Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) inspirit of Ibbotsons (1975) and 
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Leyland and Pyle (1977) and Benveniste and Spindt s truthful revelation model (1989) 
supported by Bevenite and Busaba (1996) and Aggarwal (2003) and Petway and Kaneko 
(2003) and Robinson and Pengs (2004) agency theory model of IPO and Ellul and 
Pagano’s (2006) after market liquidity suggest consistency of information asymmetry in 
IPO pricing (underpricing). Another school of thought showed underpricing phenomena 
from another dimension. They showed its not deliberate rather depends on some irrational 
behavioral aspects. Shillars (1990) impresario hypothesis and Matthew Dawson (1984) 
anchoring effect supported by Geoffrey and Swift (2009) identifies behavioral aspect of 
investor for IPO underpricing.  Based on studies by Ritter (2002) IPO underpricing in 
USA is 15.8%, in India 35.5 %, in China 164.7%, in Canada is 11%   
1.2 Overview: 
This paper mainly concentrates on the determinants of IPO underpricing in Energy sector 
of Canada.  In Canada, Energy sector is one of the fastest growing sectors attracting large 
number of investors. It mainly consists of six sub sectors namely petroleum, gas, electric 
power, coal, nuclear power, and renewable energy. According to equityclock.com survey 
results Canadian energy sector average return during past 20 periods is 11.3% and 
outperformed S&P/TSX composite by 6.8%. Energy sector has recorded highest 
frequencies of success when compared to other sectors. Based on Price Waterhouse 
Coopers (PwC) Canadian IPO market survey 2010, during the last decade, energy sector 
occupies 16% in total IPOs with CAD $6.8 billion. There were 129 energy & utility 
offerings during this period. In last three years energy & Utilities issues represented about 
23% of Canadian IPO market. Since number of studies on Canadian IPO issues in energy 
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sector are less and most of studies are dated to 1980s & 90s, sector needs for further 
research in IPO underpricing and in long- run under performance. 
1.3 Objective: 
Main objective of this paper is to investigate the degree of underpricing in Canadian 
energy sector IPO issues. Data set comprises of 430 IPOs from the year 1990-2014. The 
estimated effect of independent variables such as offer price, offer size, offer timing and 
free float on degree of IPO underpricing has also been evaluated. 
1.4 Limitations: 
In this paper to analyze the effect of determinants on degree of underpricing in Canadian 
energy sector, sample data of 430 firms has been collected and processed. Due to lack of 
required data for few firms and after processing data sample the number size has been 
reduced to 323. There is a conflict in foundation date for few firms due to mergers and 
acquisition and several other corporate factors. Due to this, the age of the firm has not 
been considered for analysis. Due to lack of proper data on underwriter reputation, 
ownership retention, over subscription rate, method of issue, market capitalizations at 
IPO were limited for analysis. 
1.5 Structure of the Paper: 
This paper consists of; Chapter1 which illustrates the background of IPO and IPO under 
pricing along with a brief overview of Canadian energy sector. Chapter2 comprises of 
literature review and researches. This chapter focuses mainly to explain different schools 
of thought, findings and conclusions by various researchers on IPO Under 
pricing.Chapter3 explains about various sources of data and different methodologies 
applied on the topic. This chapter is followed by the use of least squares linear regression 
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model to analyze the collected data samples. Chapter4 encompasses of the results and 
analysis outcomes. Chapter5 is the conclusion part of this paper which is comprised with 
conclusion and recommendations of the research findings. 
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                                                  CHAPTER 2 
     Literature Review 
2.1 Literature Review: 
 Ritter et al., (1984) asserted that many IPOs in developed and developing economies are 
on average underpriced. This claim negates the efficient market hypothesis theory which 
under certain circumstances does not yield optimum results. Studies on dynamic 
behaviour of IPO underpricing have been conducted by various researchers using various 
theories of market behaviour and factors impacting on IPO underpricing.  
An unusual first day return of 12-18% was first reported as IPO underpricing by 
Ibbotson (1972) and was also documented later in several other papers & countries. 
Among various other theories the predominant ones were which explained the 
informational use problems such as Winners curse theory or informational cascade 
mentioned by Rock (1986) or Welch (1992).  
Other theories related to various market participants are also crucial for the study. 
Schultz and Zaman (1994) looked at the behavior of underwriters in the aftermarket of 
IPOs and Aggarwal (1998) pointed out the importance of an agreement between 
underwriter and issuing company for the pricing process of IPOs. Ruud (1993) 
introduced, stabilization as one explanation for the underpricing of IPOs 
2.2 Asymmetric Information Theory: 
Among various theories to study the IPO underpricing, asymmetric information theory 
based model is one of the most prominent also known winners curse model, which 
according to Rock (1986) is, the more informed investors are about an IPO, the better are 
the chances of selecting a good IPO (adverse selection model) supported by Beatty & 
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Ritter (1986). Rock even states that in an adverse selection model (Winners Curse 
Model), the uninformed investors will end up with bad IPOs due to lack of information 
and in order to attract these uninformed investors; underwriters generally formulate an 
underpricing strategy. Carter & Manaster (1990) iterated that for informed investors the 
returns are substantially high when the exante uncertainty produces more IPO 
underpricing. Some informed investors will have more information about the sector or the 
industry in which the IPO is categorized and know more about the competition and future 
trends which provides them an edge over other players in the market.  
2.3 Moral Hazard Theory: 
According to Baron (1982) supported by Nygaard and Myrtveit (2000), moral hazard 
creates problems when managers do not reveal the true performance of the firm to the 
underwriter and more optimistic view about the future performance of the firm is 
assumed when evaluating the intrinsic value and managers refrain from their duties to act 
in a more productive way which places boundaries on the growth of the firm. Further 
Booth smiths (1986) certification model supported by Titman and Trueman (1986) 
assumes that the underwriter will certify issue price to justify the informed and 
uninformed investors. 
2.4 Reputational Capital Paradigm: 
 Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Kumar and Tsetsekosc(1993) supported the theory of 
reputational capital paradigm which emphasis on general perception of market 
participants that they associate less risky IPOs to reputed underwriters and assume that 
the market value of IPO firm is true thus leading to less underpricing activity. Also the 
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investors who are existing clients will tend towards the reputation of the underwriting 
firm since their quality of service was better and will not leave them over other firms. 
According to Allen and Faulhabers signaling model (1989) close to model of 
Griblatt Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989) inspirit of Ibbotsons (1975) support that 
underpricing of an IPO issue will leave investors with good impression about the 
underwriting firm and future issues are lot easier to sell by the same firm thus leading to 
an IPO underpricing after market activity. Reputable firms before going public should 
send signal or message to overcome asymmetric information distribution between 
investors which should be expensive to duplicate or imitate by no name companies thus 
maintaining stable market activity.  
2.5 Truthful Revelation Model: 
Leyland and Pyle (1977) and Benveniste and Spindt s truthful revelation model (1989) 
developed a theory of underwriting to improve market efficiency of IPO market in which 
the actual demand for the issue and market conditions has to be revealed to the issuer thus 
underwriters can reduce the IPO underpricing activity after market issue to some extend 
thus leaving less money on the table.  
2.6 Agency Theory Model: 
Bevenite and Busaba (1996) and Aggarwal (2003) and Petway and Kaneko (2003) and 
Robinson and Pengs(2004) supported agency theory model of IPO which focuses on 
resolving conflict issues if exits in an agency which will be usually between Principals 
(Investors) and Agents(Underwriter- Issuer). It addresses two major issues, one when 
they have conflicting goals and the other when they have different attitudes towards risk. 
Underwriters prefer to retain to fulfil their obligation for aftermarket price support of the 
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IPO firm whereas higher level of ownership for investment public induces the fear of 
varying price among investors. 
Islam and Ali (2010) observed Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) IPO underpricing 
and by performing Regression Analysis to the IPO determinants discovered that the offer 
price and the size of IPO firm are positively related to the degree of underpricing. They 
even found that the age of the IPO firm and offer timing has no relevance to the IPO 
underpricing.  
Bansal and Khanna (2012) analyzed IPOs that were listed at BSE (Bombay stock 
exchange) during (April-1999 to Dec-2012) and found a significant difference between 
the IPO’s priced through book building and fixed price option. The degree of 
underpricing also depended on the firm’s age, market cap and even retail subscriptions. 
The impact due to these determinants on retail and institutional investors was also noticed 
during this analysis.  
2.7 After Market Liquidity: 
Ellul and Pagano’s (2006) after market liquidity showed signs of consistency of 
information asymmetry in IPO underpricing. They support that after market liquidity may 
arise due to information asymmetry after the IPO, the less its liquidity is the more is the 
IPO underpricing.  
2.8 Size Based Theory: 
Ritter (1987), Chalk and Peavy (1990), Jog and Riding (1987), Suret, Cormier and 
Lemay (1990) and Clarkson and Merkley (1994) supported  a theory based on the results 
that small IPOs are more riskier than large IPOs and subsequently smaller IPOs are more 
underpriced than larger IPOs. Carter and Manaster (1990) documented that the bigger the 
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IPO is, the greater the potential gains from acquiring information about the issue because 
institutional investors consider not only the degree of uncertainty but also the size of the 
IPO.  
2.9 Behavioral Hypothesis Theories: 
Contradicting the above theory, a school of thought also suggests that IPO underpricing 
depends on the irrational behavioural aspects of the market participants. According to 
Shillars (1990) impresario hypothesis theory, impresarios (Investment Bankers) play a 
pivotal role by creating a hypothetical excess demand with a self trading strategy at 
higher prices and creating an impression among public that there is an actual demand. 
Matthew Dawson (1984) anchoring effect also known as cognitive bias theory 
where it has been noticed that humans act on a single piece of information available in 
making a decision, also supported by Geoffrey and Swift (2009) identifies that the 
deciding factor can be the behavioural aspect of investor for IPO underpricing, they also 
argue that IPO underpricing is not solely due to underwriters or bankers but due to 
overreaction of investors which fuels the price of the IPO firm immediately after market. 
With due respect these two schools of thought for IPO underpricing have conducted 
unquestionable research work but still have not reached to an unanimous solution.  
2.10 Empirical Evidence in Canadian Market: 
Previous research on IPO Underpricing in Canadian market states that there is about 11% 
to 18% of underpricing in securities issued. Shaw (1968) evidenced through his research 
the presence of overpricing in IPO issue. On contrary to Shaw, Heroux and McQuillan 
evidenced high degree of underpricing in 40% of IPO firms in Canada based on 1968-
1970 data. Jog (1997) in his extended research evidenced that the degree of under pricing 
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has been decreased in 1980 and 1990 compared to previous years. Suret, Cormier et 
Lemay (1990) reported, degree of under pricing is high in IPOs issued under Toronto 
Stock Exchange compared to degree of under pricing in IPOs issued under Quebec Stock 
Saving Plan (QSSP). 
Research by Falk and Thornton (1992) stated the average initial returns in Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSX) IPOs 19%, Montreal Exchange (ME) IPOs 25% and Alberta Stock 
Exchange (ASE) IPOs 307%. 
Paper by Maher Kooli and Jean-Marc Suret (September 2001) concluded that, the 
degree of underpricing in Canadian IPOs decreased with increase in size of issue and 
underwriter reputation. It also concluded that the degree of under pricing is high in 
mining, oil & gas, real estate and technologies sectors IPOs. Vijay. M and Allan L. 
Riding (1987) concluded that after three trading days, degree of underpricing had 
diminished.  
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            CHAPTER 3 
Methodology 
3.1 Source of Data 
Data set in this paper comprises of 430 IPOs from 1990 to 2014 of Canadian energy 
sector. The data set satisfies the following conditions 
1) All IPOs  are listed in Canadian securities exchanges 
2) All the IPOs should have information on offer price, offer size, announced date, 
listing date, first trading day closing price, number of share outstanding. 
3) Industry sector: Energy 
Based on the data availability and standards, sample data consists of 323 firms for 
analysis. All information and data are available through Bloomberg. 
3.2 Alternative Methodologies: 
IPO under pricing data is noisy, complex and correlated. In addition, investor’s behaviour 
and different environmental conditions add more weight to irregularities in the data.  In 
order to estimate this kind of data, researchers are employing different methodologies.  
3.2.1 Artificial Neural Networks:  
This method normalizes data by examining it to develop internal representation of the 
relationships between the data. These networks are more responsive and adaptive to 
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3.2.2 Evolutionary Models: 
These models are paired with other models to improve robustness, reliability and 
adaptability. One of these models is rule based system which uses variables to explain 
whole set.  
3.2.3 Two-layered Evolutionary Forecasting: 
This model performs linear regression model to deal with the outliers and isolates noisy 
patterns. It has the ability to back test and reconstruct the model. 
3.2.4 Agent Based Modeling: 
This model effectively deals with autonomous behaviour of investor which is sometimes 
impossible to predict with variables. 
To analyse IPO underpricing in this paper, linear regression model is employed. This 
model effectively estimates effect of independent variables by minimizing error term in 
sample data to define population set.  
3.3 Variable Selection: 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable: 
According to standard methodology, Underpricing is defined as percentage change from 
the offer price to closing price 
    DUP =     P1-P0 
                                   P0 
DUP= Degree of under pricing 
P1= first trading day closing price 
P0= offer price at which the share has been issued 
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables: 
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Offer Price:   
Firms choose offer price to compensate for purpose of their needs. Offer price and 
uncertainty are inversely related. If offer price is low level of uncertainty will be high. 
H1: Sign of coefficient of Offer price estimator is negative. 
Size of offer:  
Offer size is the total shares firm offers for IPO. Studies by Ibbotson (1984), Chalk and 
Peavy (1990) and Clarkson and Merkley (1994) show inverse relationship between offer 
size and uncertainty. Investors estimate the uncertainty level based on offer size. That is 
if offer size increases then level of under pricing decreases.  
H2: Sign of coefficient of Size of offer estimator is negative. 
Offer Timing:  
The difference between announced date and listing date is termed as offer timing. Issuers 
use the time difference to advertise about firm and to attract investors. Balwinder Singh 
and RK Mittal (2003), Taufil Mohd K.N (2007), and Bansal and Khanna (2012) found 
offer timing as one of the important variables in determining level of uncertainty in IPO 
issue. There is direct relation between offer timing and uncertainty level. If offer timing 
increases then degree of under pricing increases 
H3: Sign of coefficient of Offer timing estimator is positive. 
Free float: 
Percentage of equity share issued to public to total number of shares is known as free 
float. This gives the information about supply side of IPO by the firm. Sohail and Nasr 
(2007) found an inverse relationship between free float and level of uncertainty. As free 
float increases then degree of under pricing decreases. 
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H4: Sign of coefficient of free float estimator is negative 
3.4 The Model: 
The sample of 323 firms listed in Canadian Stock Exchanges 1990 to 2014 out of 423 
firms is analyzed using linear regression model Different variables are selected based on 
prior empirical studies, research theories and availability of data to find out which 
variables are significant in determining the degree of under pricing in Canadian energy 
sector. The empirical equation is as follows: 
Log(DUP) = α0+β1log(Ofsiz)+β2(OFP)+β3(OFT)+ β4(Float)+µ 
Where, 
Log (DUP): Degree of under price, proxy is ln (P1-P0).Prior empirical use was done  
                                        P0 
 by Sohail and Nasr (2007), Bansal & Khanna (2012) 
Log (Ofsiz): offer size, proxy is ln (No. of shares offered multiplied by offer price). Prior 
empirical use was done by Beaty and Ritter (1986), Ibbotson (1984), Kaneko and Pettway 
(2003). 
OFT: offer timing, Time difference from announced date to listing date (in days). Prior 
empirical use was done by Islam, Ali and Ahmad (2007). 
Float: Free float, proxy is percentage of equity share issued for public to total issued 
share. Prior empirical use was done by Sohail and Nasr (2007). 
OFP: offer price, proxy is the first trading day close price. 
3.5 Sense of the Model: 
The Ordinary Least Square Regression model has estimator based analysis and sample set 
of population should be normally distributed to explain the population set. The coefficient 
of each variable explains the degree of dependence of the explanatory variable. That is 
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the coefficient (βs) value indicates the percentage of variation in Independent variable 
due to explanatory variable, here in this paper log (ofsize), OFT, OFP, Free Float are 
explanatory variables and log(Dup) is the independent variable. The t-table is used to 
explain the significance of the variation in explanatory. R-square explains the overall 
explanatory power of the model. P-value gives the level of significance.  




      Analysis of Results 
4.1 Identification of Level of Underpricing or Over Pricing: 
This section presents the level of underpricing and overpricing in the Canadian Energy 
Sector. Table 01 presents overall levels of IPO underpricing and over pricing in Canadian 
energy sector. It shows that overall level of underpricing in Canadian energy sector is 
12.49% with standard deviation of 36.917. There are 260(80.99%) IPO underpriced, 
54(16.824%) IPO over priced and 7(2.18%) IPO Similar priced during 1990(Jan)-
2014(Jan). 




Mean level Maximum Minimum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Underpricing 260 12.49503 284.7143 0.001 36.91735 
Overpricing 54 -0.2365909 -0.002 -0.9785 0.2852138 
Similar 
pricing 7 0 0 0 0 
Total 321 10.08079 284.7143 -0.9785 33.58609 
 
4.2 IPO Underpricing on Yearly basis: 
This section identifies the level of underpricing on yearly basis from 1990-2014. Table 02 
illustrates yearly level of IPO underpricing in Canadian energy sector.  
The highest degree of under pricing took place in 1995 (27.34%) with standard deviation 
of 78.021. The next highest level of underpricing took place in 2008 ( 21.714% )with 
stand deviation of 50.34%. Highest number of firms listed in the year 1997 of 38 but the 
level of under pricing was low of 5.69%. 
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1993 1 0.21875 0.21875 0.21875 --- 0.31 
1994 11 20.87501 224 -0.105263 67.37901 3.41 
1995 16 27.3374 284.7143 -0.785 78.02096 4.95 
1996 32 17.58876 230 -0.893333 52.00999 9.91 
1997 38 5.697554 44 -0.415 11.87054 11.76 
1998 12 1.271167 3.9 -0.5 1.294234 3.72 
1999 5 4.286981 15.802 -0.9785 6.712418 1.55 
2000 5 9.706604 47 0.173077 20.85325 1.55 
2001 15 8.531422 61 -0.705333 15.74384 4.64 
2002 12 10.83222 39.53333 -0.05 14.41795 4.02 
2003 7 17.25752 99 0.075 36.38363 2.17 
2004 24 3.036314 19.88233 -0.755 5.564211 7.43 
2005 27 9.637527 66.428 -0.46 18.76457 8.36 
2006 30 3.791552 29 -0.88833 7.82511 9.29 
2007 24 16.46663 211.5 -0.346153 44.27771 7.43 
2008 18 21.71409 209 0.065 50.34161 5.57 
2009 9 4.757519 18.336 -0.355 6.489143 2.79 
2010 16 2.808685 19.833 -0.22 5.640321 4.95 
2011 9 0.3598342 2 -0.035384 0.6647677 2.79 
2012 2 -0.012960 0.007 -0.032921 -0.0129609 0.93 
2013 2 0.0850238 0.2666667 -0.022666 0.13208 1.24 
2014 3 0.4371032 1 0.0166667 0.5069096 0.93 
 
From Table 03 and graph 01 it is evident that the highest level of under pricing took place 
during 1994-1996 and again during 2007-2008. The highest number of IPO listing took 
place during 1996-1997 and again during 2004-2007. This explains during boom listing 
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Graph 01: Level of underpricing yearly  
  
4.3 Result of Cross Sectional Regression Analysis: 
Ordinary least square (OLS) regression is used to explain the cross-sectional variation in 
the abnormal returns. Table 04 provides the results of regression model. The results 
obtained by running regression analysis on STATA.  
 
The regression models’ result suggest the following: 
OFSIZ:  From the results beta value of offer size is -0.3327802 which means that 
variation in the degree of underpricing has negative relation with offer size. Here p-value 
is 0.001 suggesting highly significant relationship at 1% level of significance in Canadian 
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energy sector.The relationship is consistent with the findings of Beatty and Ritter (1986), 
Chalk and Peavy (1990), Clarkson and Merkley (1994), Ibbostson (1984), kaneko and 
pettway(2003), Islam, Ali & Ahmad (2010). Hence null hyothesis can be rejected. 
OFT: Regression model results suggest that beta value of Offer timing is 0.0026569. 
There is a positive relation between degree of under pricing and offer timing. Here p-
value is 0.135suggesting that offer timimg has no significant effect on level of under 
pricing in Canadian energy sector. Therefore hypothesis 3 is not sustained. (Refer 
Chapter 3). 
Float: Beta value of free float variable from the regression model result is 0.1028901. 
This shows positive relationship between degree of underpricing and free float in 
Canadian energy sector. The p-value is 0.003 which is highly significant at 1% level of 
significance. Though there is highly statisticaly significant effect on level of under 
pricing but the result is controrary to expected. 
OFP: from the table 04, the result of variable offer price shows that there is negative and 
significant, at 5% level of significance, relationship between level of under pricing and 
offer price. Therefore null hypothesis  is rejected. 
The adjusted R-square is 36.83%. This means that offer price, size of the firm; offer 
timing, free float can explain 36.83% of variation of degree of underpricing in Canadian 
energy sector. This indicates that there are factors that may explain 63.17% of degree of 
underpricing in Canadian energy sector.  
4.4 Adequacy of the Model: 
4.4.1 Auto-Correlation effect: 
Table 05 gives Dickey-Fuller test results. According to Dickey-fuller test there is no 
serious auto-correlation problem in the sample data set. The p-value is 0; suggest the 
   
25 
 
absence of serious auto-correlation effect. The Durbin-Watson falls within the range of 
acceptability (1.83). Therefore there is no serial correlation problem in the data. 
Table 05: Dickey-Fuller Test Result 
 
 
4.4.2 Multicollinearity Effect: 
The results of Variance Inflator Factor (VIF) test are shown in Table 06. The VIF (1-10), 
tolerance (0.1-1) falls into the range of acceptability. Therefore according to the results 
there is no serious Multicollinearity problem in the regression model.  




4.4.3 Normality & Linearity of Data: 
Below graph shows the histogram of the data. Histogram suggest the normality of the 
data. Graph 03, P-P Plot and  shows that data is linear.  
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Graph 02: Histogram of data  Graph 03: P-P plot of Linearity  
   
          
      4.4.4 Heteroskedasticity Effect: 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook- Weisberg test for Heteroskedasticity, which tells whether the 
variance from distribution term for each explanatory variable is statistically same (homo) 
or not (hetero) is conducted. According to test results, shown in Table 07, Chi square 
value of 0.32 suggests null hypothesis of constant variance  that cannot be rejected 
because p>chi at 57.39% . F-value of regression model result is high of 38.75% and is 
significant at 1% significance level. 
Table 07: Heteroskedasticity Test 
 
All the above test results identify the robustness of the model and therefore the model is 
adequate. 




    Conclusion & Recommendation 
 
This paper attempts to design for and test empirical models which integrate company 
specific and issue specific factors to explain IPO underpricing in Canadian energy sector 
from 1990-2014. This paper identifies level of underpricing or overpricing, level of 
underpricing on yearly basis. Multiple linear regressions are used to distinguish the 
relationship between various independent variables with the dependent variable. The 
independent variable are offer price, offer size, offer timing and free float to explain 
dependent variable – level of underpricing.  
Out of 323 sample data set of Canadian energy sector IPO firms from 1990-2014, 
260 (80.99%) are underpriced and 54 (16.824%) are overpriced and 7(2.18%) are similar 
priced. The overall level of over pricing is -0.2356909% with standard deviation of 
0.2852138. The IPOs in Canadian energy sector are under priced at 12.49% with standard 
deviation of 36.9173. This result is almost consistent with earlier findings by Ritter and 
equityclock.com survey results.  
Using a regression approach, degree of underpricing is explained by size based 
theory suggested by Ritter (1987), Chalk and Peavy (1990), Jog and Riding (1987), Suret, 
Cormier and Lemay (1990) and Clarkson and Merkley (1994) and behavioural theories of 
IPO pricing. It is found that other than offer timing all other variables considered in 
regression function have significant effect on IPO underpricing. In particular offer size 
and offer price has negative and significant effect on IPO underpricing in Canadian 
energy sector. These results explain empirical existence of the winners curse hypothesis 
model (Rock 1986, Beatty and Ritter1986). The general demand and supply theory is 
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found irrelevant in initial issue market of Canadian energy sector since free float has 
positive impact on IPO underpricing.  
This is only short run IPO performance analysis and it estimates the effect of most 
common variables. Nonetheless, the limitations of this study can open an opportunity for 
further research work in this field. Overall result can be improved by adding more factors 
and observations into the study, but the only concern is lack of available research on the 
topic.  




Rock, K. (1986). ―Why New Issue are Under Priced‖, Journal of Financial Economics, 
15, 187-212.  
Ritter, J.R., (1984), ―Signaling and the Evaluation of Unseasoned New Issues: A 
Comment‖, The Journal of Finance, 39, 1231-1237.  
Islam,A. and ali, R. (2010), ―Underpricing of IPOs: The case of Bangladesh‖, Global 
Economy and Finance Journal, Vol.3 No.1, pp. 44-61.  
Kumar P.C. and Tsetsekos, (1993), ―Asymmetric information, Investment Banking 
Contracts and the Certification Hypothesis‖, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
17(1),pp117-129  
Shillar.R.J. (1990), ―Speculative Prices and Popular Models‖, Journal of economic 
Persrective, Vol 4,no 2, pp 55-65  
Leyland.H and D. Pyle, (1977), ―Informational asymmetries, Financial structure and 
Financial intermediation‖, Journal of Finance, vol32, pp 371-387  
Megginson. W.L. and Katheleen A.Weiss. (1991), ―Venture capitalist certification in 
initial public offering‖, The journal of Finance, 46 pp. 879–903  
Titman, S., & Trueman, B., (1986), ―Information Quality and the Valuation of New 
Issues‖, Journal of Accounting and Economics 8:159-172  
Welch, Ivo, (1989), ―Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of 
Initial Public Offerings‖, Journal of Finance 44, 421—449.  
Geoffrey C., and C. Swift, (2009), ―Overreaction in the thrift IPO aftermarket‖, Journal 
of Banking & Finance 33(7), pp. 1285-1298. Available at 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/financefacpub/5/.  
   
30 
 
Carter R. and S. Manaster (1990), ―Initial public offerings and underwriter reputation‟, 
Journal of Finance‖, 45: 1045-1068  
Bansal, R., and Khanna, A., (2012), ―IPOs Underpricing and money left on the table in 
indian market‖, International Journal of Research in Management, Economics and 
Commerce ,Vol2, Issue 6(June 2012), pp106-120  
Baron, David P.,(1982), ―A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and 
Distribution Services for New Issues‖, Journal of Finance 37, 955—976.  
Beatty R. and Ritter J., (1986), ―Investment Banking, Reputation, and the Under-pricing 
of Initial Public Offerings‖, Journal of Financial Economics 15, p. 213-232  
Booth.J. and R. Smith. (1986), ―Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certification 
Hypothesis, Journal of Financial Economics‖, 15,pp261-281  
Allen, Franklin, and Gerald R. Faulhaber, (1989). ―Signaling by Underpricing in the 
IPO Market‖, Journal of Financial Economics, vol 23, pp 303-323.  
Ibbotson, R., Sindelar, J., Ritter, J. « The market's problems with the pricing of initial 
public 
offerings », Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 7, 66-74, 1994. 
Benvenniste L.M., W Y Busaba and W.J. Wilhelm, (1996), ―Price Stabilization as a 
bonding Mechanism in new equity issues‖, Journal of financial Economics, Vol 42 no 2 
pp223-255  
Nygaard, A., Myrtveith, I. Moral hazard, competition and contract design: Empirical 
evidence from managerial, franchised, and entrepreneurial businesses in Norway. 
Applied Economics. 32 (3): 349-356 
   
31 
 
VijayM. Jog and Allan L. Riding, Underpricing in Canadian IPOs: Financial Analysts 




Q-Q plot of linearity 
 
APPENDIX B 


























Ltd 247.501 10.5 
12/17/2





Corp 35.1325 2.35 
08/24/2
007 Energy 13000000 2.38 
06/18/ Canadian 0.225 0.1 06/18/1 Energy 2250000 3 










Energy Inc 0.175 0.35 
10/17/1




Oil & Gas 
Inc 65.55 2 
11/19/2






Partners 252.703 16 
11/21/2




Energy Inc 568 16 
06/08/2





Corp 700 35 
07/29/2






n Ltd 0.28 0.2 
09/27/2





Corp 0.35 0.1 
08/12/2






Inc 72.6 10 
08/11/2




2011 Abby Inc 0.359662 0 
07/11/2





Corp 2.3287 0.18 
03/20/2





Corp Ltd 250.5 15 
05/09/2






Corp 21.9105 1 
08/04/2
011 Energy 20000000 0.99 
02/24/
2011 CEU CN 87.6245 1.4 
04/12/2




Energy Inc 1.5 10 
12/21/2




Energy 45 4 
11/23/2
010 Energy 10000000 3.74 








Coal Inc 0.31996 0.2 
01/31/2




Inc 4.34773 0.85 
12/02/2






Ltd 0.22 0.1 
07/27/2




Oil Corp 57.2 1 
05/28/2





Corp 1 0.2 
04/23/2




er Corp 0.3 0.1 
07/14/2






Inc 66.125 3 
03/30/2





Ltd 0.3 0.2 
03/12/2






al Co 0.24 0.2 
02/05/2




Energy Inc 0.25 0.2 
11/05/2






ies In 0.2 0.2 
10/16/2




Energy Inc 0.6 0.2 
10/22/2




Energy Inc 1.5 0.1 
07/14/2






Corp 0.2 0.1 
04/21/2




West Inc 1.2155 0.5 
01/09/2




rg Energy 0.2 0.1 
02/10/2
009 Energy 2000000 0.6 








Inc 0.2 0.2 
09/25/2




Energy Inc 0.25 0.1 
09/08/2





Corp 0.2 0.1 
09/05/2






Corp 0.4 0.2 
07/25/2





Energy Inc 15 0.25 
07/15/2




an Plc 0.4 0.1 
05/15/2





n Ltd 0.8 0.2 
06/17/2





Energy Inc 0.66 0.2 
04/25/2






Lt 0.7 0.2 
03/31/2






Inc 0.25 0.1 
04/03/2




Coal Corp 1.225 0.35 
04/17/2




Coal Corp 0.9 0.1 
05/06/2





Corp 0.3 0.25 
05/30/2






Corp 0.2 0.1 
01/28/2





Inc 0.2 0.1 
03/31/2
008 Energy 2000000 0.3 






Energy Inc 0.2 0.2 
02/04/2
008 Energy 1000000 1.2 
11/22/
2007 Biox Corp 0.24 0.1 
02/12/2





Corp 1.5 1.5 
12/28/2





Ltd 0.5 0.2 
11/05/2




Coal Ltd 0.5 0.1 
08/07/2





Ltd 0.6 0.2 
09/24/2






Inc 60.3 9 
05/23/2





Corp 0.4 0.1 
07/16/2





Inc 0.2 0.1 
04/19/2




Corp 40.2499 2.25 
04/17/2





Ltd 0.4 0.15 
04/12/2




Coal Corp 0.3 0.1 
02/06/2




Coal Corp 1.15 0.2 
02/28/2




rgy Corp 0.3 0.2 
03/28/2





PLC 0.3 0.3 
05/09/2




Energy Inc 0.2 0.2 
03/15/2





Group Ltd 0.85 0.2 
02/15/2




Vista 0.25 0.1 
04/23/2
007 Energy 2500000 3 









Corp 0.2 0.1 
05/04/2





ent Corp 0.65 0.15 
02/23/2





Ltd 0.25 0.2 
12/21/2






Inc 3.12 1 
11/22/2




Ltd 0.506 0.23 
10/30/2





Ltd 0.9 0.1 
02/08/2





Ltd 0.8 0.2 
02/12/2




Energy Inc 0.75 0.2 
10/30/2





Ltd 1.35 0.2 
11/27/2




ic Ltd 0.58245 0.15 
09/12/2





Inc 0.3 0.2 
08/04/2





Ltd 0.8 0.2 
12/27/2






Ltd 0.3 0.2 
07/10/2




Energy Inc 62.23 2.1 
06/05/2





Ltd 0.3 0.1 
05/29/2
006 Energy 3000000 0.2 
02/17/ Schneider 0.5 0.2 05/03/2 Energy 2500000 0.7 
   
37 
 





Corp 1.5 0.3 
07/27/2





Ltd 0.2 0.1 
03/28/2






Servi 1.5 0.15 
03/23/2





Energy Inc 0.21 0.15 
05/23/2






Corp 0.2 0.1 
03/27/2





Corp 0.20575 0.2 
08/18/2





Inc 0.75 0.25 
01/16/2






Corp 0.5 0.2 
07/20/2





Ltd 0.25 0.2 
11/11/2





Ltd 3.4743 0.75 
11/11/2






Inc 2 0.2 
11/07/2




E&P Inc 115 5 
12/13/2




Wind Inc 0.45 0.15 
10/25/2





Energy Inc 3.02015 1.5 
10/18/2
005 Energy 2013430 0.81 
06/27/ Magnum 1.5 0.75 09/28/2 Energy 2000000 0.7 











Ltd 21.3393 1.75 
11/08/2





Corp 45 10 
09/21/2




Oil & Gas 
Ltd 3.30515 0.5 
06/29/2






Ltd 1 0.2 
06/29/2







In 84 10 
07/21/2




Ltd 0.3 0.1 
05/24/2






Inc 1.2 0.15 
05/19/2





Ltd 0.5 0.25 
05/18/2






Ltd 25.012 13 
03/16/2




Corp 0.5 0.1 
03/24/2





Corp 1 0.1 
03/11/2






Trust 51 10 
01/25/2





Petroleum 1.5 0.25 
12/14/2
004 Energy 6000000 1.44 









n Corp 0.4 0.2 
11/24/2





Ltd 0.4 0.1 
10/14/2




Group Inc 1.5 0.25 
08/27/2





Ltd 1.5 0.3 
07/29/2




Energy Inc 0.2 0.1 
06/18/2





Ltd 0.52345 0.2 
06/08/2





Ltd 1.775 0.3 
06/03/2





Coal Corp 57.2 2.6 
05/12/2





n Ltd 1.125 0.25 
05/06/2





n Ltd 10.125 10 
05/06/2





Inc 1.15 0.2 
05/03/2





s Ltd 6.001 1.7 
04/28/2





Ltd 0.35 0.1 
04/13/2





Inc 1.5 0.3 
04/08/2





Inc 0.24 0.1 
02/03/2
004 Energy 2400000 0.32 
05/06/ North 0.03 0.02 07/14/2 Energy 1500000 2 










Energy Inc 198 12 
06/19/2





Ltd 114.99 8.5 
05/25/2





Group Inc 15.795 7.5 
11/17/2





Ltd 1674.4 28 
05/29/2





Group Inc 60.5 11 
05/01/2





es Inc 221 10 
08/09/2





Ltd 13.1301 0.3 
03/12/2





Trust 244.145 10 
08/10/2














Trust 393.3 10 
04/21/2





Inc 196.267 13 
05/26/2




e Oil Corp 241.5 21 
11/23/2





Trust 169.5 10 
11/24/2












Oil Corp 1350 18 
04/08/2




Power 110.4 1.5 
07/07/2
009 Energy 66667000 1.48 







Energy Inc 31 8 
06/30/2





Inc 27.0436 2.6 
12/11/2






Inc 120.181 11 
12/06/2






a 72 4 
10/24/2





ental Ltd 40 10 
08/24/2






Corp 140 10 
09/07/2






Fund 172.5 10 
06/27/2




Energy Inc 35 4 
06/28/2






Income T 68.4176 10 
06/14/2






Trust 25 10 
02/22/2






Tec 58.9387 10 
03/02/2






Ltd 50 16 
02/06/2






Fun 57.4309 8.75 
08/03/2
005 Energy 6563530 8.95 
04/19/ Capstone 211.69 10 04/30/2 Energy 21169000 9.52 







2003 Jed Oil Inc 13.9079 5.5 
04/05/2






Corp 150.02 26 
10/05/2





Corp 624.25 10 
10/24/1






Trust Unit 870 10 
10/01/1






Fund 68.215 10 
06/10/1






LP 82.5 25 
07/16/1





Ltd 375 10 
11/27/1
997 Energy 37500000 5.85 
11/27/
1997 Arcis Corp 6 0.5 
11/27/1














Energy Inc 0.29 0.2 
04/06/1






Inc 0.3 0.15 
02/05/1






Ltd 16.5 2.65 
09/17/1






n Ltd 10 1.85 
06/24/1




Petroleum 1.5 0.75 
06/24/1
997 Energy 2000000 0.72 







Energy Inc 4 1.25 
06/03/1




Energy Inc 0.3 0.2 
04/25/1






Ltd 5 5 
03/26/1





al Inc 1.5 1.5 
04/04/1







Corp 0.3 0.2 
04/22/1





Ltd 3 0.4 
03/19/1





Corp 0.3 0.1 
02/06/1






a 0.3 0.15 
05/30/1





Inc 0.2 0.1 
04/24/1





Inc 0.2 0.1 
11/13/1





Ltd 0.3 0.2 
03/13/1





Corp 0.2 0.1 
09/10/1





Corp 0.3 0.15 
05/27/1






ons Cor 3.57 0.85 
06/10/1




Bay 0.3 0.15 
04/16/1
998 Energy 2000000 0.485 








Corp 0.3 0.2 
12/27/1




Energy Inc 0.3 0.15 
07/23/1





n Corp 0.3 0.1 
12/13/1





Ltd 16.5 3 
04/09/1













Oil & Gas 
Inc 0.3 0.15 
04/17/1





Corp 19.95 2.85 
10/31/1





Gas Ltd 0.2 0.1 
11/08/1





Ltd 1.2 0.4 
09/04/1





Energy Inc 0.3 0.1 
08/21/1





Corp 10.2 0.6 
09/30/1






Energy Inc 0.2 0.1 
12/13/1





Corp 0.2 0.2 
04/11/1





Corp 0.3 0.2 
10/09/1






ie 0.75 0.25 
10/15/1
996 Energy 3000000 0.33 
05/29/ Patria 0.25 0.1 05/29/1 Energy 2500000 0.35 











Corp 0.3 0.1 
09/26/1





Trust 249 10 
10/07/1




Corp 15.504 6 
08/16/1





Corp 2.5 1.25 
05/08/1





n Inc 5 1 
07/02/1





Corp 2.25 0.5 
07/30/1






Ltd 13.88 2 
12/09/1




Corp 1.8 0.4 
02/28/1




Energy Inc 6 1000 
04/17/1





n Ltd 50 5 
03/13/1





Services 8.55 4.75 
06/16/1





ent Corp 1.125 1.25 
06/03/1





Inc 0.3 0.6 
10/12/1





Inc 0.525 0.3 
11/08/1





Corp 1.05 0.35 
08/22/1
994 Energy 3000000 0.52 







Ltd 1.65 0.3 
11/02/1





Ltd 0.3 0.6 
10/24/1




Energy Inc 0.2 0.2 
10/19/1





Ltd 0.3 0.2 
09/27/1





Ltd 9.5179 5 
11/07/1




Oil & Gas 
Ltd 0.55 0.5 
08/30/1





Ltd 0.3 0.1 
09/07/1





s Inc 1.5 5 
09/29/1





Ltd 8 2.5 
07/21/1




Oil Corp 15.75 1.05 
09/06/1





Corp 0.3 0.15 
06/22/1





n Inc 0.4 0.2 
06/20/1





Group Inc 0.2 0.1 
10/29/1





Ltd 0.42 0.35 
05/31/1






Co Ltd 0.42 0.6 
03/13/1




& Gas Ltd 0.551 0.2 
10/31/1
994 Energy 2753000 0.22 







Corp 4 1 
11/16/1





Corp 1.1615 1 
04/08/1





Ltd 5.2568 4 
11/18/1





Inc 0.2 0.1 
04/23/1




Oil & Gas 
Ltd 1.00215 0.75 
12/09/1






Inc 0.2 0.1 
11/27/1




Energy Inc 0.2 0.5 
11/05/1





Ltd 0.2 0.1 
10/13/1





Ltd 0.3 0.2 
05/12/1






Ltd 9 6 
05/05/1




Oil Corp 172.5 10 
04/14/2






Fund 154 10 
12/20/2




Energy Inc 316.925 17.5 
11/15/2






Corp 310 10 
08/24/2






Energy Inc 30.03 3.85 
05/10/2
005 Energy 7000000 4.05 
03/09/ Pine Cliff 5.46301 0.15 04/11/2 Energy 36420000 0.3783 









Oil & Gas 
Ltd 72 18 
04/05/2






Ltd 160.55 9.5 
07/29/2




Energy Inc 28.75 1.25 
05/26/2





Inc 301.4 22 
04/15/2





Inc 1.5 0.15 
03/05/2






n Inc 0.45 0.3 
01/28/2




Oil Corp 52.5 10.5 
02/03/2





Ltd 15 3 
12/15/2





Ltd 0.3 0.3 
12/01/2






Ltd 2.31 0.3 
11/28/2





Corp 1.75 0.3 
11/12/2





Gas Trust 202.996 10 
10/15/2





Corp 0.75 0.15 
07/24/2





Ltd 4.00392 0.45 
12/19/2
002 Energy 8307610 4.95 
11/27/ Harvest 30 8 12/05/2 Energy 3750000 8.5066 









Energy Inc 1 0.25 
12/03/2






Inc 0.54108 0.15 
10/10/2





n Ltd 0.25 0.25 
07/08/2






s Ltd 40 1.25 
07/30/2






Ltd 0.3 0.2 
06/13/2





Inc 0.555 0 
03/08/2




Energy Inc 0.3 0.15 
11/30/2





Corp 0.3 0.15 
06/13/2




Oil & Gas 
Corp 0.5 0.2 
03/12/2




Energy Inc 0.5 0.3 
02/28/2





Inc 0.2 0.2 
01/15/2
002 Energy 1000000 6 
08/20/
2001 Lexoil Inc 0.3 0.2 
10/26/2





Ltd 0.5 0.2 
10/05/2





Ltd 0.5 0.2 
02/14/2





Ltd 0.3 0.3 
06/01/2
001 Energy 1000000 2.28 






Corp 0.499 0.15 
03/06/2





Ltd 0.25 0.2 
03/06/2





Ltd 1.3047 0.6 
02/22/2





ents Inc 0.75 0.25 
02/13/2





Corp 0.5 0.3 
07/09/2





Inc 0.45 0.15 
06/15/2






Corp 0.5 0.3 
05/10/2





n Ltd 0.3 0.2 
10/17/2






Ltd 0.5 0.2 
12/04/2




Energy Inc 0.3 0.15 
12/15/2





Inc 0.5 0.2 
04/19/2






Ltd 0.5 0.25 
09/20/2






Ltd 23.1 7 
06/28/2





Corp 27 2 
06/05/2




Corp 0.3 0.1 
03/27/1
998 Energy 3000000 0.49 








Inc 0.3 0.1 
01/19/1






Resources 28 14 
10/14/1





Inc 0.3 0.3 
04/22/1





Inc 1.05 0.35 
04/15/1





Inc 0.2 0.1 
02/06/1





Corp 0.2 0.2 
05/09/1






Inc 0.26 0.1 
03/10/1





Corp 0.2 0.2 
1997-






Ltd 0.45 0.6 
03/13/1





Corp 0.2 0.2 
02/11/1





Trust 200.031 10.1 
01/28/1





Corp 1.3 0.4 
01/03/1






Trust 143.22 10 
12/18/1




Energy Inc 0.2 0.1 
10/16/1
996 Energy 2000000 0.56 






Gold Corp 0.2 0.1 
08/22/1




NGL LP 81.5048 10.4 
07/31/1





Income 52.89 10 
07/31/1














Ltd 180 10 
07/11/1















n Inc 1 0.5 
04/11/1





Ltd 0.2 0.1 
11/16/1





Energy Inc 0.3564 0.81 
10/04/1






s Inc 0.75 0.5 
06/22/1





Ltd 270 10 
11/30/1





Corp 0.204 0.17 
09/29/1





Ltd 0.25 20 
10/13/1






Corp 0.63 0.35 
12/23/1




Energy Inc 0.4 0.2 
10/15/1
999 Energy 2000000 3.361 
 
